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Este estudio reporta estimaciones de una función de reacción de política
monetaria para Colombia durante el período 1991 a 1999. Los resultados
indican que durante este período el Banco Central adoptó una regla im-
plicita cuyo objetivo era la tasa de inﬂación. La evidencia tambien sugiere
q u ee lB a n c oC e n t r a lr e s p o n d i óal ai n ﬂación anticipada en contraposición
al ai n ﬂación rezagada. De acuerdo con los resultados, aún bajo la exis-
tencia de una banda cambiaria cuyo objetivo era servir de ancla nominal
para la política monetaria, el Banco Central tuvo espacio para movimientos
independientes de la tasa de interés siempre y cuando la tasa de cambio no
se encontrara en alguno de los dos extremos de la banda.
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This paper characterizes empirically how the Central Bank of Colombia has con-
ducted monetary policy since 1991 when the new political constitution declared
complete autonomy of the Bank in policy management with the sole objective of
controlling the growth of prices in the economy. The announcement of inﬂation
objectives began in Colombia in the early 1990s. In 1991, the new constitution
established the independence of the Banco de la República and mandated that
the design and execution of monetary, exchange rate and credit policies was the
exclusive responsibility of its Board of Directors. It also stated that the Central
Bank needed to “preserve the purchasing power of the currency” (article 373), and
in 1992 a new law (Law No. 32) mandated that the Board of Directors announced
aq u a n t i t a t i v ei n ﬂation objective each year1.
There are two main issues that motivate this research. First, after more than
a decade of high and persistent inﬂation (an average of 24.9% between 1975 and
1992), Colombia has experienced a considerable decline in price growth during
the past eight years when inﬂation has ﬁnally decreased below 20% and has even
reached single digit numbers in 1999. This period coincides with that for which
the Central Bank has been independent with the sole concern of reducing price
growth. It is worthwhile then to assess the performance of the Central Bank
during this period and bring forward some of the most important lessons of this
experience for future policy-making in Colombia.
Second, given that for most of the period under analysis the country used an
exchange rate band, it can be interesting to think of the monetary policy during
the last years as one in which the interest rate is an operating instrument while
the exchange rate is an intermediate target. The estimation of a policy reaction
function can be useful to evaluate whether the Central Bank still had space for
i n d e p e n d e n tm o v e m e n t si nt h et a r g e ti n t e r e s tr a t e ,s ol o n ga st h ee x c h a n g er a t e
was not exactly at either edge of the band.
In this paper, I estimate a monetary policy reaction function for Colombia
during the period between September 1991 and October 1999.
Section 2 below presents an estimable policy reaction function. The baseline
speciﬁcation has a central bank adjusting the nominal short term interest rate
in response to the gaps between expected inﬂation and output and their respec-
tive targets. The model corresponds to the kind presented by Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1997) and employed in their study of monetary policy in several countries
1See Uribe D. et al., 1999.
2including the U.S., Germany and Japan. It is essentially a forward looking version
of the simple backward looking reaction function popularized by Taylor (1993).
Additionally, I present several alternatives to the baseline speciﬁcation in
which the central bank responds to variables other than inﬂation and output. This
can be particularly relevant given that the country faced external constraints on
monetary policy imposed primarily by the target zone. One of these alternatives
allows to test the forward looking versus the backward looking speciﬁcations of
the reaction functions.
Section 3 presents the results of the analysis for Colombia. Overall, the base-
line speciﬁcation of the reaction function does a good job in characterizing mon-
etary policy for the country after 1991. The kind of rule that emerges is what
one might call “soft-hearted” inﬂation targeting: In response to a rise in expected
inﬂation relative to target, the Central Bank raises nominal rates suﬃciently to
push up real rates. The estimated rule thus implies a clear focus on controlling
inﬂation. At the same time, there is a modest pure stabilization component: hold-
ing constant expected inﬂation, the Central Bank adjusts rates in response to the
state of output.
Concluding remarks are in section 4.
2. Speciﬁcation of a Monetary Policy Reaction Function
The basic framework pertains to a central bank that has at least some degree of
autonomy over its monetary policy. The starting point is the observation that,
for most central banks, the main operating instrument of monetary policy is a
short term interest rate. Typically, the instrument is an interbank lending rate
for overnight loans. The empirical policy reaction function developed by Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1997) characterizes how central banks choose the level of the
short term rate from period to period.
To make sense of this class of policy reaction functions, the analysis appeals to
existence of temporary nominal wage and price rigidities. With nominal rigidities,
monetary policy aﬀects real activity in the short run. By varying the nominal rate,
a central bank can eﬀectively vary the real interest rate and the real exchange rate.
The process of imperfect wage and price adjustment gives rise to a positive short
run relationship between output and inﬂation. This implies, for example, that
reducing inﬂation may require a period of output reduction, depending on the
degree of nominal stickiness. In this kind of setup, is possible to envision a central
bank choosing the course of short term interest rates.
3Assume that each period the central bank has a target for the nominal short
term interest rate r∗




t = r + β [E(πt+n|Ωt) − π
∗]+γ [E(yt|Ωt) − y
∗
t] (2.1)
where r is the long run equilibrium nominal rate, πt+n is the rate of inﬂation
between periods t and t+n ,yt is real output, and π∗ and y∗
t are respective bliss
points for inﬂation and output. y∗
t is given by potential output, deﬁned as the level
that would arise if wages and prices were perfectly ﬂexible. E is the expectation
operator and Ωt is the information available to the central bank at the time it sets
interest rates. Equation (2.1) implies that the short term interest rate adjusts in
response to deviations of inﬂation from target, as well as in response to deviations
of output from the ﬂexible price level of output.
The nominal interest rate equilibrium level is deﬁned as:
r = rr + π
∗ (2.2)
and
rrt = rt − E(πt+n|Ωt)
where rrt is the real interest rate. If we combine these equations we obtain:
rr
∗
t = rr +( β − 1)[E(πt+n|Ωt) − π
∗]+γ [E(yt|Ωt) − y
∗
t] (2.3)
where rr is the long run equilibrium real rate of interest. According to equa-
tion (2.3), the target real rate adjusts relative to its natural rate in response to
departures of either expected inﬂation or output from their respective targets.
The magnitude of the parameter β is key to this analysis. If β > 1 t h et a r g e tr e a l
rate adjusts to stabilize inﬂation. With β < 1, the monetary policy will instead
accommodate changes in inﬂation: even if the central bank raises the nominal
rate in response to an expected rise in inﬂation, for example, it does not increase
it suﬃciently to keep the real rate from declining. The estimated magnitude of
the parameter β provides an important yardstick for evaluating a central bank’s
policy rule.
This target policy is a generalization of the type of the simple interest rate
rule proposed by Taylor (1993) and Henderson and McKibbon (1993) among oth-
ers. This rule, has the central bank respond to lagged inﬂation as opposed to
4expected future inﬂation. The speciﬁcation in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997)
however, nests the ”Taylor” rule: if either lagged inﬂation or a linear combination
of lagged inﬂation and the output gap provides a suﬃcient statistic for inﬂation,
then the speciﬁcation reduces to the simple Taylor rule. The general speciﬁca-
tion has several virtues: (i) by explicitly incorporating expected inﬂation makes it
easier to disentangle the link between the estimated coeﬃcients and central bank
objectives and (ii) by having the central bank respond to forecasts of inﬂation and
output, this general speciﬁcation incorporates a realistic feature of policy-making
a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c hc e n t r a lb a n k sc o n s ider a broad array of information.
A simple equation like (2.1), however, does not capture the tendency of central
banks to smooth changes in interest rates2. In order to capture these factors, it
is simply assumed that the actual rate partially adjusts to the target as follows:
rt =( 1− ρ)r
∗
t + ρrt−1 + νt (2.4)
where the parameter ρ ∈ [0,1] captures the degree of interest rate smoothing,
and νt is assumed to be serially uncorrelated. νt could reﬂect a pure random
component to policy, or could arise because the central bank imperfectly forecasts
idiosyncratic reserve demand, and for some reason, does not instantly supply
reserves to oﬀset the shock.
We can rewrite equation (2.1) in the following way:
r
∗
t = α + βE(πt+n|Ωt)+γE(xt|Ωt) (2.5)
α ≡ r − βπ
∗
xt = yt − y
∗
t
Further, we can combine equations (2.4) and (2.5) to obtain:
rt =( 1− ρ){α + βE(πt+n|Ωt)+γE(xt|Ωt)} + ρrt−1 + νt (2.6)
Finally, we eliminate the unobserved forecast variables from this expression by
rewriting the policy rule in terms of realized variables as follows:
rt =( 1− ρ)α +( 1− ρ)βπt+n +( 1− ρ)γxt + ρrt−1 + εt (2.7)
2See e.g. Goodfriend (1991).
5where the error term εt depends on νt and the forecast errors of inﬂation and
output gap:
εt = −(1 − ρ){β [πt+n − E(πt+n|Ωt)] + γ [xt − E(xt|Ωt)]} + νt (2.8)
Given that we assume rational expectations, we know that the forecast errors
will be uncorrelated with any information at time t. Hence we can deﬁne ut as a
collection of variables observable to the central bank at t, but orthogonal to νt
3.
Possible elements of ut include any lagged variables that help forecast inﬂation
and output, as well as any contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with
the current interest rate shock νt.Then, since E (εt|ut)=0 , equation (2.7) implies
the following set of orthogonality conditions that will be used for estimation:
E [rt − (1 − ρ)α − (1 − ρ)βπt+n − (1 − ρ)γxt − ρrt−1|ut]=0 (2.9)
To estimate the parameter vector [β,γ,ρ,α] I use generalized method of mo-
ments4. In the baseline case the instrument set ut includes lagged values of output,
inﬂation, interest rates, and the change of the log of the real exchange rate. Each
of these variables is potentially useful for forecasting inﬂation and output and is
exogenous with respect to the interest rate shock, given our identifying assump-
tions. Since the potential instrument set, and hence the number of orthogonality
conditions, exceeds the parameter vector, the model is overidentiﬁed, in which case
it is straightforward to test the over-identifying restrictrions (Hansen (1982)). Un-
der the null hypothesis of this test, the central bank adjusts the interest rate each
period so that (2.6) holds, with the expectations on the right hand side based on
all the relevant information available to policymakers at that time. Under the
assumptions of the model, this implies the existence of values for [β,γ,ρ,α] such
that the implied residual εt is orthogonal to the variables in the information set
3The econometric approach relies on the assumption that, within the short sample, short
term interest rates and inﬂation are I(0). Standard Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests
of the null that the short term interest rate is I(1) are rejected in favor of the alternative of
stationarity. In the case of the inﬂation rate there is less evidence against the null that this series
is I(1). However, we know that the Dickey-Fuller test has low power against the alternative of
stationarity for short samples, which is our case.
4The composite disturbance term of the model has an MA(n-1) structure (Hansen and Ho-
drick (1980)). In this case the GMM estimator of the parameter vector is a two-step nonlinear
two-stage least squares estimator (Hansen (1982)) when the model is overidentiﬁed. In the ﬁrst
step, we use traditional non-linear two-stage least squares to obtain an initial estimate of the
parameters. Then these initial parameter estimates are used to construct an optimal weighting
matrix.
6Ωt. Under the alternative, however, the central bank adjusts the interest rate in
response to changes in some current and/or lagged variables, but not necessarily
in connection with the information that those changes contain about future inﬂa-
tion and output. In this case, some relevant ”explanatory variables” might have
been omitted from the interest rate equation (2.7). To the extent that some of
those variables are correlated with ut, the set of orthogonality conditions will be
violated, which would lead to a statistical rejection of the model.
Using the parameter estimates of α and β, it is possible to recover an estimate
of the central bank’s target inﬂation rate π∗. While we cannot separately identify
π∗ and rr, the model provides a relation between the two variables that is condi-







The sample average real rate can be used to provide an estimate of rr. Then
it is possible to construct an estimate of π∗ .
For the Central Bank of Colombia I estimate the baseline speciﬁcation for the
period for which there was at least some degree of autonomy over domestic mone-
tary policy. It is possible that there may be other important factors that inﬂuence
interest rate setting besides those captured in the baseline model as I discussed in
the introduction. In this case, while the Central Bank did not completely sacriﬁce
monetary control, it may have pursued policies to maintain exchange rates within
reasonable bounds. Exchange rates may thus have inﬂuenced policy, indepen-
dently of the information they contain about inﬂation and output. In addition, it
is possible that the Central Bank could have paid attention to monetary aggre-
gates. To account for these possibilities I consider a number of simple alternatives
to the baseline policy. Let zt denote a variable besides inﬂation and output that
may potentially inﬂuence rate setting (independently of its use for forecasting).
For each alternative speciﬁcation, we then replace the relation for the target given
by equation (2.5) with the following
r
∗
t = α + βE(πt+n|Ωt)+γE(xt|Ωt)+ξE[zt|Ωt] (2.11)
The alternative speciﬁcation is estimated in the same fashion as the baseline,
except that the parameter vector is expanded to include the coeﬃcient ξ on the
additional variable zt, and expand our instrument list to include lagged values of
that variable. After doing so, it is straightforward to evaluate the quantitative
7importance of zt on policy. The variables I consider include:r e a lexchange rate,
money supply and lagged inﬂation. By including the latter I obtain a direct test of
the forward looking speciﬁcation of the policy rule versus the ”backward looking”
speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule.
In estimating (2.9) or alternatively the set of orthogonality conditions implied
by (2.11) I consider the horizon of the inﬂation forecast that enters the reaction
function as being one year, i.e. n =1 2 .A c c o r d i n gt oC l a r i d a ,G a l ia n dG e r t l e r
(1997), it is reasonable to believe that policy-makers are unconcerned about the
m o n t ht om o n t hv a r i a t i o ni ni n ﬂation and instead are more concerned about
medium and longer term trends. Hence, a year ahead forecast seems to be a good
indicator of a medium term trend in inﬂation.
3. Monetary Policy Rules for Colombia after 1991
I now proceed to estimate a monetary policy reaction function for the Central
Bank of Colombia. The bank has been virtually autonomous over its domestic
monetary policy since 1991 when the new political constitution declared complete
autonomy of the Central Bank and gave them the unique objective of controlling
inﬂation. Given that the country used an exchange rate band during most of
this period, the baseline speciﬁcation according to which policy responds purely
to domestic macroeconomic conditions has to be interpreted with caution. Fur-
thermore, an alternative speciﬁcation that includes the real exchange rate as an
additional determinant of the short term interest rate might be more relevant to
ac o u n t r yt h a tf a c e dt h i st y p eo fe x t e r n a lc o n s t r a i n t s 5.
Figure 1 plots the rate of consumer price inﬂation and the short term interest
rate (the inter-bank lending rate) for the period between 1989 and 1999. Note ﬁrst
the high and persistent rate of inﬂation for the ﬁrst part of the period, with rates
even above 30% at the end of 1990 and beginning of 1991. In 1992 we can observe
a clear pattern of disinﬂation up to 1999 when the inﬂation rate was around 9.2%.
On the other hand, we can observe a change in the pattern of behavior of short
term interest rate that occurs roughly around 1993. Prior to this date, the central
bank kept short term interest rate at or below the rate of inﬂation. Real short term
5Clavijo (2002) mentions that the inclusion of the real exchange rate in a Taylor rule is not
the best approach to follow given the problems associated to the uncertainty of the long-term
purchasing power parity. Instead, he uses the (unconvered) interest rate parity condition and
argues that its eﬀect on net international reserves translates into changes in the relation between
monetary aggregates and domestic interest rates.
8rates accordingly hovered around zero and below. During 1992 and 1993 however,
real as well as nominal short term rates moved up signiﬁcantly. What can be
key is not exactly the secular behavior of short term rates, but rather a sort of
co-movement with inﬂation that we can observe during this period. One possible
explanation that can arise is that the Central Bank shifted the monetary policy
to raise short term real rates to oﬀset inﬂationary pressures. This conjecture
is investigated formally by estimating the policy reaction function described in
section 2.








1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Inflation Interest rate
The starting date for the estimations is September 1991. In July 7th 1991 the
new political constitution was signed. Since that day, the Central Bank has been
autonomous to conduct monetary policy in the country. Nevertheless I allow for
a two-month adjustment in which the institutions restructured according to their
new functions and objectives. For this reason the sample starts in September
1991 and ends in August 1999 which is the last available data. I use the consumer
price index to measure inﬂation and an index of industrial production to measure
output. To obtain a measure of the output gap, I detrend the log of industrial
production using a quadratic trend. The interest rate is the interbank lending
9rate6.
I ﬁrst estimate the baseline speciﬁcation for policy, given by equation (2.6).
The instrument set includes 1-6, 9, 12 lagged values of: the output gap yt,i n ﬂation
πt, the interbank lending rate rt and the log diﬀerence of the real exchange rate,
qt.
The top line of Table 1 reports the results for the baseline speciﬁcation. The
key result is the estimate of the coeﬃcient on the inﬂation gap, β : 1.34 with a
standard error of 0.18. A rise in expected annual inﬂation of one percent induces
the Central Bank to raise real rates by 34 basis points. Because β is signiﬁcantly
greater than one, the prediction that the Central Bank raises real rates in response
to inﬂationary pressures is statistically signiﬁcant.
Another interesting result is that the estimate of the coeﬃcient on the output
gap is positive and also statistically signiﬁcant: 0.19 with a standard error of 0.06.
Thus, holding constant expected inﬂation, a one percent rise in the output gap
induces the Central Bank to increase nominal (and thus real) rates by 19 basis
points. The GMM estimation procedure yields (asymptotically) correct standard
errors, and thus allows to conﬁrm the statistical signiﬁcance results. Finally,
the J-statistic implies that we do not reject the overidentifying restrictions of
the baseline model. These results are in clear contrast with those reported by
Clavijo (2002). According to the author, estimates of the Taylor rule are not
satisfactory with both, monetary and output gaps, turning out insigniﬁcant and
with unexpected signs. Only the interest rate parity condition appears to be
signiﬁcant. These results, however, must be interpreted carefully given that as
can be observed from equation (2.7), the error term εt depends on νt (interest
rate shock) and the forecast errors of inﬂation and output gap. This means that
ordinary least squares estimates of the Taylor equation are inconsistent.
T h es a m p l ea v e r a g er e a lr a t e- w h i c hIt a k ea st h ee s t i m a t eo ft h el o n gr u nr e a l
rate- is 4.55. Using this estimate, I obtain an estimate of the long run inﬂation
target, π∗ of 11.4 which roughly corresponds to the average of annual objectives
set by the Central Bank since the date in which it is considered independent which
equals approximately 13%.
Next, I consider alternatives to the baseline speciﬁcation. First, I allow lagged
inﬂation to enter the reaction function, along with expected inﬂation and output.
6It is worth mentioning, however, that starting in 1995 the repo-rate was instituted as one
of the main instruments of monetary policy.
10ß γ ρ α ξ
Baseline 1.34 0.19 0.10 0.59 ---
(0.18) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Adding:
Lagged Inflation
1 1.14 0.08 0.005 -0.41 -0.32
(0.23) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.27)
Money Supply
2 1.24 0.10 0.06 -0.53 -0.35
(0.15) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.18)
Real Exchange Rate
3 1.44 0.24 0.11 -0.34 0.002
(0.17) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.00)
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions for:
Baseline Specification J = 23.1  with p-value = 0.844
Specification 1 J = 24.2  with p-value = 0.933
Specification 2 J = 27.3  with p-value = 0.949
Specification 3 J = 27.2  with p-value = 0.921
The sample is 1991:9 - 1999:8.The instruments are  y t-1...y t-6,y t-9, y t-12, p t-1...p t-6,p t-9, p t-12, 
r t-1...rt-6, r t-9, r t-12,z t-1...zt-6, z t-9, z t-12, q t-1...qt-6, q t-9, q t-12 where q is the change in the log
of the real exchange rate. Estimates are obtained by GMM with correction for MA(12) auto-
correlation. Optimal weighting matrix obtained from first step two-stage least squares parameter 
estimates.
1. p t-12
2. M1 money growth over last 3 months.
3. Lagged levels of real exchange rate also included in instrument list.
Central Bank Reaction Functions
11Lagged inﬂation is not statistically signiﬁcant and the point estimate for the
associated coeﬃcient has the wrong sign. Furthermore, this alternative speci-
ﬁcation does not perceptibly change the estimate of the coeﬃcient β although
the estimate of γ is reduced to half. Taken together, the results suggest that the
backward-looking speciﬁcation can be rejected in favor of the forward -looking
one.
T h em o n e ys u p p l yi sa l s ou n i m p o r t a n t .I nt h i sc a s e ,Ii n c l u d ea na v e r a g eo f
the past three months money (M1) growth in the reaction function. The variable
is not signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The other key coeﬃcients in the reaction
function are virtually unchanged.
Finally I consider the level of the real exchange rate as an external constraint
to monetary policy. Each variable does enter signiﬁcantly and with the right
sign, but the quantitative eﬀect of the real exchange rate is considerably small.
Once again, the estimates of the slope coeﬃc i e n t sa r ev i r t u a l l yt h es a m ea si nt h e
baseline case. The results indicate that a 10 percent real depreciation induces a
2 basis point increase in the short term interest rate.















































To gain some feel of how well does the baseline speciﬁcation in explaining the
12behavior of the Central Bank, I plot the implied target rate versus the actual
rate. I include 1990 in the sample just for comparison purposes. This means,
that I compare the implied target using the post-1991 rule to the pre-1991 data
as well as to the post-1991 data. This might give an idea of the policy shift after
independence was granted to the bank. Figure 2 shows these results.7 We can
observe, that starting in 1992 the target rate implied by the estimated model
nicely tracks the behavior of actual rates in Colombia. We can observe, still,
temporary deviations. Note for example that for most of 1997 the target rate is
above the actual. During this year the exchange rate remained for most of the
time at the bottom of the band, hence it is possible that the Central Bank did
not need to be as tight. The comparison with pre-1991 is clear. The post-1991
rule implies a target rate much higher than the actual rate.
4. Concluding Remarks
The results presented above show that since 1991 the Colombian Central Bank
has pursued what can be called a “soft-hearted” inﬂation targeting: In response
to a rise in expected inﬂation relative to target, the Central Bank raises nominal
rates suﬃciently to push up real rates. This behavior is statistically signiﬁcant
and quantitatively important. However, there is a modest pure stabilization com-
ponent to the rule, holding constant expected inﬂation, the Central Bank adjusts
rates in response to the position of output relative to trend, but not by a signif-
icant amount. The primary focus of monetary policy appears to be on inﬂation.
When including the real exchange rate in the speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient turns
o u tt ob es i g n i ﬁcant but quantitatively small. The inclusion of this variable, does
not change the other slopes considerably.
This kind of simple rule appears to set the economy on a course for stable long
term inﬂation using relatively little knowledge about the economy. Because the
rule is simple for the private sector, it is conducive to building and maintaining
credibility.
On the other hand, even with the existence of the exchange rate band, it can
be said that the Central Bank still had scope for independent movements in the
target interest rate, so long as the exchange rate was not right at either edge of
the band. In the cases in which the exchange rate was at the bottom edge of the
band, the bank could loosen its policy temporarily.
7Note that I use the target rate as opposed to the ﬁtted rate (which would include the lagged
interest rate).
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